



Pique curiosity, not diabetic fingers

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Hello!




Axelle Apvrille

Principal Security Researcher at

Fortinet, @cryptax

Mobile malware, IoT, **Ph0wn CTF**



Travis Goodspeed

Digital watchmaker and Studebaker
enthusiast, @travisgoodspeed

GoodFET, **GoodWatch**, PoC||GTFO



Flash Glucose Monitoring systems

Diabetes Technol Ther. 2009 Jun; 11(Suppl 1): S-11–S-16.


doi: [10.1089/dia.2009.0002](https://doi.org/10.1089/dia.2009.0002)

PMCID: PMC2903977

PMID: [19469670](https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/19469670/)

A Tale of Two Compartments: Interstitial Versus Blood Glucose Monitoring

Eda Cengiz, M.D.[✉] and William V. Tamborlane, M.D.



@cryptax testing the sensor!

Screenshot from <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2903977/>




Sensor life cycle

Assemble pack




Apply sensor



Activate it (60 min)



Use it



Expires after 14 days



Wanna hack? Working around limitations

- 1 Max life time
- 2 Warm up time
- 3 Geographical location



Disclaimer



Those hacks work on the **technical** side

They haven't been tested from a medical point of view, and we strongly discourage diabetic users to play with them

but an attacker could...



Resurrection Demo



Backup slides :P

GoodV

```
INFO: 0004ae10cf0300a007e0f307
SERIAL: e007a00003cf10ae
VARIANT: GCM
BLOCKLEN: 8
PAGE: 0
JTAGLOCK: UNLOCKED
RESET VEC:da50
STAGE: Expired
INDICATOR:00
STATE: 00df0000010000
WEAR : 21530 minutes
REGION: France
Trend idx:9
Hist idx: 11
```

EXPORT TO CLIPBOARD

Expired

GoodV

```
Successfully erased tag
e007a00002b308e1 :))
```

Reset the sensor

GoodV

```
INFO: 0004e108b30200a007e0f307
SERIAL: e007a00002b308e1
VARIANT: GCM
BLOCKLEN: 8
PAGE: 0
JTAGLOCK: UNLOCKED
RESET VEC:da50
STAGE: To Activate
INDICATOR:00
STATE: 00df000001640f
WEAR : 0 minutes
REGION: France
Trend idx:0
Hist idx: 0
```

EXPORT TO CLIPBOARD

"To Activate" stage now




How does that work?




Let's speed through previous work
More information: watch our talk at [BlackAlps 2019](#)



Tear down the sensor



Blocks exposed by NFC



Sponge wet with hot sugar to simulate glucose

Tag UID : E007A00003183AD2

Tag Info: Texas Instrument France

Valid ISO15693 Tag Found - Quitting Search

Reading memory from tag UID=E007A00003183AD2

Tag Info: Texas Instrument France

Block 00	F4 18 B0 32 03 01 02 08	...2....
Block 01	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
Block 02	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
Block 03	F9 2B 0E 08 1F 00 C0 96	.+.....
Block 04	AB 80 1E 00 C0 92 AB 80	
Block 05	1F 00 C0 96 AB 80 1F 00	
Block 06	C0 92 AB 80 1E 00 C0 8E	



Working out memory layout

Section	Begin	End
Activation blocks	F860	F877
Glucose records	F878	F99F
Sensor region	F9A0	F9B7
Commands	F9B8	FFCF
Footer	FFD0	FFF7



```
F878 Block 03 0A BA 03 04 03 02 C8 04 Block CRC Trend index History index 1st Trend Record
F880 Block 04 04 00 01 02 C8 28 A1 00 ... continued Trend Records
F888 Block 05 01 02 C8 28 A1 00 ... continued Trend Records
```

Trend records

```
F8D8 Block 0F C8 1C A1 00 1E 03 C8 04 Last trend record 1st History Record
F8E0 Block 10 02 00 EC 02 C8 E8 61 00 ... continued History Records
F8E8 Block 11 07 02 C8 94 61 00 07 02 ... continued History Records
F8F0 Block 12 C8 40 A1 00 00 00 00 00 ... continued History Records
```

History records

```
F978 Block 23 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ... continued History Records
F980 Block 24 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ... continued History Records
F988 Block 25 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ... continued History Records
F990 Block 26 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ... continued History Records
F998 Block 27 00 00 00 00 44 00 00 Last history record Wear time
```



A3 Raw Read

CodeBrowser: rf430fr152h_rom/rf430tal152h.bin

File Edit Analysis Navigation Search Select Tools Window Help

Program Trees

- rf430tal152h.bin
 - ROM
 - SRAM
 - FRAM

Program Tree

Symbol Tree

- Imports
- Exports
- Functions
- Labels
- Classes
- Namespaces

Filter:

Data Type Manager

- Data Types
 - BuiltInTypes
 - rf430tal152h.bin

Filter:

Listing: rf430tal152h.bin

rf430tal152h.bin

```
*****
*                               FUNCTION
*****
undefined fram_a3_rawread()
R12_lo:1 <RETURN>
fram_a3_rawread
fbca 0a 12          PUSH.W R10
fbcc 92 12 20 1c    CALL    &->rom_passwordcheck
fbdb 4c 93          TST.B   R12
fbd2 14 24          JEQ     LAB_fbfc
fbd4 f2 90 05       CMP.B   #0x5,&RF13MFI0FL
00 0c 08
fbda 10 20          JNE     LAB_fbfc
fbdc 1d 42 06 08    MOV.W   &RF13MRXF,R13
fbd0 5f 42 06 08    MOV.B   &RF13MRXF,R15
fbd4 0d 93          TST.W   R13
fbd6 07 20          JNE     LAB_fbfc
fbd8 7f 93          CMP.B   #-1,R15
fbda 05 20          JNE     LAB_fbfc
fbec 92 12 94 1c    CALL    &->FUN_58f8
fbf0 c2 43 08 08    MOV.B   #0,&RF13MTXF
fbf4 12 3c          JMP     LAB_fc1a
LAB_fbfc
```

Decompile: fram_a3_rawread - (rf430tal152h.bin)

```
1  /* WARNING: Globals starting with '_' overlap smaller symbols
2
3  undefined2 fram_a3_rawread(void)
4
5  {
6      char cVar1;
7      ushort uVar2;
8      undefined2 uVar3;
9
10
11     cVar1 = (*(code *)PTR_rom_passwordcheck_1c20)();
12     if ((cVar1 == '\0') || (RF13MFI0FL != '\x05')) {
13 LAB_fbfc:
14         uVar3 = 0;
15     }
16     else {
17         if ((RF13MRXF == 0) && (RF13MRXF == 0xff)) {
18             (*(code *)PTR_FUN_1c94)();
19             _RF13MTXF = _RF13MTXF & 0xff00;
20         }
21         else {
22             if (0xf < RF13MRXF) goto LAB_fbfc;
23             _RF13MTXF = _RF13MTXF & 0xff00;
24             uVar2 = 0;
25             while (uVar2 < (RF13MRXF & 0xff)) {
26                 _RF13MTXF = *(ushort *) (uVar2 * 2 + _RF13MRXF);
27                 uVar2 = uVar2 + 1;
28             }
29         }
30     }
```

Console - Scripting

fbf2 | fram_a3_rawread | JEQ 0xbfc

Ghidra: rf430fr152h_r... | CodeBrowser: rf430fr1... | ghidra-cmdtable.png ... | xterm

xterm <2>

5:37



Dump firmware

You're up to level!



Now, let's have a close look to E0



- ```

FUNCTION
=====
undefined |undefined rom_calledby_e0|
undefined2 |R12,lo,1 <RETURN>
undefined1 |R15:2 addr
 |R14,lo:1 len
 |rom_calledby_e0
 |XREF[1]: 5266(w)
 |XREF[1]: 5274(w)
 |XREF[4]: 1c72(*), 50aa(*),
 | F0H 514, 5266(c),
 | fram_e0.fbc2(c)

5256 0a 12 PUSH.W R10
5258 b2 40 80 MOV.W #0x5a80,&MDCTCL
 |5a 5c 01
525e 5a 42 03 08 MOV.B &F0F1MDCTCL_H,R10
5262 c2 03 03 06 MOV.B #0, &F0F1MDCTCL_H
5264 0a 40 7a 78 MOV.W #0x0f87a,addr
526a 7e 40 93 00 MOV.B #0x93,R14

zeroize trend record table and history table: we zeroize 0x93...
LAB_526e
526e 0f 43 00 00 MOV.W #0,0x0(addr)==>trend_index
5272 2f 53 INCD.W addr
5274 7e 53 ADD.B #1,len
5276 fb 23 JNE LAB_526e
5278 a2 b2 c3 1c BITT.B #4,&OAT_1cc3
527c 16 28 JNC LAB_526a
5280 3f 40 66 fb MOV.W #0xf866,addr
5282 7e 40 09 00 MOV.B #0x9, len

zeroize 0x09 words after the expiration indicator in the head...
LAB_5286
5286 0f 43 00 00 MOV.W #0,0x0(addr)==>OAT_f866
528a 2f 53 INCD.W addr
528c 7e 53 ADD.B #1,len
528e fb 23 JNE LAB_5286
5290 c2 43 65 fb MOV.B #0,&fram_expirationindicator
5294 0f 43 00 00 MOV.W #0,addr
 |Start a new life!

```

# We (nearly) know how to reset a sensor

- Set Stage of Life byte
- Set Activity Switch byte
- Clean up the Glucose records section: this also resets the *wear time count*

But we need to **compute correct CRCs** for section we patch!



Computing a CRC shouldn't be difficult, right?



# Which one is it? ...

| Algorithm                          | Result | Check  | Poly   | Init   | RefIn | RefOut | XorOut |
|------------------------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|-------|--------|--------|
| <a href="#">CRC-16/CCITT-FALSE</a> | 0x29B1 | 0x29B1 | 0x1021 | 0xFFFF | false | false  | 0x0000 |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/ARC</a>         | 0xBB3D | 0xBB3D | 0x8005 | 0x0000 | true  | true   | 0x0000 |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/AUG-CCITT</a>   | 0xE5CC | 0xE5CC | 0x1021 | 0x1D0F | false | false  | 0x0000 |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/BUYPASS</a>     | 0xFEE8 | 0xFEE8 | 0x8005 | 0x0000 | false | false  | 0x0000 |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/CDMA2000</a>    | 0x4C06 | 0x4C06 | 0xC867 | 0xFFFF | false | false  | 0x0000 |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/DDS-110</a>     | 0x9ECF | 0x9ECF | 0x8005 | 0x800D | false | false  | 0x0000 |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/DECT-R</a>      | 0x007E | 0x007E | 0x0589 | 0x0000 | false | false  | 0x0001 |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/DECT-X</a>      | 0x007F | 0x007F | 0x0589 | 0x0000 | false | false  | 0x0000 |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/DNP</a>         | 0xEA82 | 0xEA82 | 0x3D65 | 0x0000 | true  | true   | 0xFFFF |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/EN-13757</a>    | 0xC2B7 | 0xC2B7 | 0x3D65 | 0x0000 | false | false  | 0xFFFF |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/GENIBUS</a>     | 0xD64E | 0xD64E | 0x1021 | 0xFFFF | false | false  | 0xFFFF |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/MAXIM</a>       | 0x44C2 | 0x44C2 | 0x8005 | 0x0000 | true  | true   | 0xFFFF |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/MCRF4XX</a>     | 0x6F91 | 0x6F91 | 0x1021 | 0xFFFF | true  | true   | 0x0000 |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/RIELLO</a>      | 0x63D0 | 0x63D0 | 0x1021 | 0xB2AA | true  | true   | 0x0000 |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/T10-DIF</a>     | 0xD0DB | 0xD0DB | 0x8BB7 | 0x0000 | false | false  | 0x0000 |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/TELEDISK</a>    | 0x0FB3 | 0x0FB3 | 0xA097 | 0x0000 | false | false  | 0x0000 |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/TMS37157</a>    | 0x26B1 | 0x26B1 | 0x1021 | 0x89EC | true  | true   | 0x0000 |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/USB</a>         | 0xB4C8 | 0xB4C8 | 0x8005 | 0xFFFF | true  | true   | 0xFFFF |
| <a href="#">CRC-A</a>              | 0xBF05 | 0xBF05 | 0x1021 | 0xC6C6 | true  | true   | 0x0000 |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/KERMIT</a>      | 0x2189 | 0x2189 | 0x1021 | 0x0000 | true  | true   | 0x0000 |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/MODBUS</a>      | 0x4B37 | 0x4B37 | 0x8005 | 0xFFFF | true  | true   | 0x0000 |
| <a href="#">CRC-16/X-25</a>        | 0x906E | 0x906E | 0x1021 | 0xFFFF | true  | true   | 0xFFFF |



# Tried them all, none matched!

To be honest, several months past before we found the solution...



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This thread has been locked.  
If you have a related question, please click the "[Ask a related question](#)" button in the top right corner. The newly created question will be automatically linked to this question.

## A question about CRC module of MSP430F5438

 milangqingren  Prodigy 235 points

Aug 18, 2009 3:21 PM

 old\_cow\_yellow  Guru 58965 points  
Community Member

The CRC module is shifting the bits in the opposite direction of CRC16 CCITT.

Locked

## Shifts bits in the opposite direction






# Kill a sensor

We know how to *resurrect* a sensor.  
An attacker may want to do the  
opposite: **kill** a sensor.

- Corrupt the memory of the sensor. Quick, easy and dirty.
- Or set Stage of Life to 5 (or 6).



Corrupt memory



# Wanna hack? Working around limitations

- 1 Max life time: **HACKED**
- 2 **Warm up time**
- 3 Geographical location



# Demo: Set up



Sensor



[\*] Hack PatchTimeValues: we set warmup=5  
weartime=6912000 minutes



Show time



# Backup slides ;P



Warm up time modified  
to 2 minutes



Wear limit hacked to  
4800 days

We can hack glucose  
value with a Frida hook

# Wanna hack? Working around limitations


- 1 Max life time: **HACKED**
- 2 Warm up time: **HACKED**
- 3 **Geographical location**



# Sensor region

- Sensor region is located in the *sensor section*
- Flip region indicator
- Recompute CRC of section
- Activate sensor

| Code | Geographic region |
|------|-------------------|
| 01   | Europe/UK         |
| 02   | US 10-day sensors |
| 08   | Israel            |



# Wanna hack? Working around limitations

- 1 Max life time: **HACKED**
- 2 Warm up time: **HACKED**
- 3 Geographical location: **HACKED**

Requires NFC proximity + secret password





# Conclusion

We bypass all limitations  
although, globally, the design is good / has been done with care

## Mitigation

For an attacker, it is **far easier** to:

- Infect the victim's phone with a ransomware
- Or create a fake diabetes app

## The weakest link is the smartphone

Debate: can we secure smartphones for critical uses?



# References

- Security analysis of a Connected Glucose Sensor, Technical report
- GoodV Android application
- Readdump.py
- NFC exploitation with RF430RFL152 and 'TAL152, PoC || GTFO, 20:03
- Presentation at BlackAlps 2019



# Thank You

Contact us:  
@cryptax @travisgoodspeed

Thanks to:  
Anonymous diabetic contacts :) and  
@aamirlakhani @PagetPhil @TuxDePoinssie @aurelsec  
@passthesaltcon

